The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: A Celebration to Lament Washington’s Sterile Havana Strategy.

photo: Ilker Ender / flickr.com

This past February marked the 50th anniversary of Washington’s embargo against Cuba. The birthday, which went uncelebrated here and in the Caribbean, was a grim reminder of the persistence of one of Washington’s most egregious foreign policy blunders.

Enacted less than a year after President Kennedy’s ill-fated attempt to unseat Fidel Castro’s fledgling communist government at the Bay of Pigs, the embargo was designed with the express purpose of ousting Castro and his fellow revolutionaries from power. Renewed on a yearly basis under the aegis of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the policy was last extended in September 2011 by President Obama, who stated, “I hereby determine that the continuation for 1 year of [the embargo] with respect to Cuba is in the national interest of the United States.”

But is it?

In the 1960s, when the embargo was young and the United States was in the throes of the Cold War, that Washington would seek to ostracize the newly installed communist government in Havana is understandable. Fidel Castro had, after all, just toppled the U.S.-backed Batista regime, and subsequently nationalized all American holdings on the island. And in October 1962, a scant eight months after President Kennedy’s embargo went into full effect, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. U.S.-Cuban relations remained rocky throughout the Cold War, and in 1996, ties were further marred by an incident in which the Cubans shot down two privately flown Cessna planes which had crossed into their airspace, killing the four Cuban Americans on board.

The Cuba of the 1960s, however, is not the Cuba of today. Since his assumption of the presidency in 2006, Raúl Castro has done away with many of the restrictions on the purchase of cell phones, microwaves, and other long-sought items previously prohibited under his brother’s rule. He has overhauled the system of compensation in all state-run companies to better reward the most productive employees, and has fired numerous government officials said to have been standing in the way of further economic reform. Raúl’s tenure has seen the privatization of portions of the economy so as to create and bolster a new “non-state” sector, as well as the release of the last of the political dissidents jailed in the 2003 Black Spring crackdown.

Myanmar: by-elections. A curtain raiser.

photo: Stefan Munder / flickr.com

“This is a very dangerous attitude to think that any politician is too high up to be involved in the basis of parliamentary democracy. I think we all have to start with at least a sense of humility” – Aung San Suu Kyi in defence of her decision to contest said that it is in no way beneath her dignity to do so.

This is only the second election in the country in the past two decades.  The last  nation wide election held in November 2010 was condemned as totally flawed  and rigged.

Though the outcome of this by election will not in any way alter the equations in the government dominated by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in all the central and regional assemblies, much heat has been generated in the run up to the election for two reasons.  First, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi which had boycotted the 2010 elections is participating and Suu Kyi herself is contesting from a constituency (Kawhmu Township) in South Yangon.  Two, the Western countries have made the holding of free and fair election as a condition for easing the economic sanctions imposed by them.

This election will also be unique in that the Myanmar government has agreed to allow ASEAN, the US and the EU to send observers for the by-election. It will be the first time that the country has permitted international observers for an election.

Putin and Ukraine: The Calm Before the Storm.

photo: Firdaus Omar / flickr.com

Relations between Moscow and Kyiv have been unexpectedly rocky in recent years. However, as Russia entered its latest election cycle, the Kremlin’s attention drifted away from Ukraine. While there was little doubt that Vladimir Putin would return to power, the president-to-be had to contend with the sudden awakening of parts of the Russian electorate. Now that he has been returned to office for the next six years, the question is how much time he will have for Ukraine.

For months Ukraine neither figured as an issue in Russian electoral debates, nor did the Kremlin aggressively pursue its plans for Kyiv to join a Customs Union along with Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, Moscow kept Kyiv close, playing a cat-and-mouse game of engaging in negotiations, but refusing any concessions, particularly on gas prices. Russia also threatened serious sanctions for Ukraine should Kyiv sign the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) and even started a new trade war by imposing a ban on Ukrainian cheese imports.

Knowing the Kremlin’s history and tactics, these measures were designed to end in little more than friendly spats. Now that he is firmly back in the Kremlin, elites in Kyiv have little doubt that Putin will shift his attention to Ukraine. Their only uncertainty is how quickly this shift will take place and how forceful Moscow will be in pursuing its demands.

There is a lot at stake. Putin needs Kyiv’s support for his Customs and Eurasian Union projects. Control of Ukraine’s gas transit system (GTS), with its storage facilities and the access it would provide to Ukraine’s consumer energy markets, is also top on Moscow’s list of priorities. Equally, a number of Russian industries would dearly like to gain control of key areas of the Ukrainian economy, especially in the aviation, communications, and agricultural sectors. In the strategically vital Black Sea region, Moscow would like to bring to an end a long-lasting dispute with Kyiv over the status of the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Azov, as well as receive permission for the upgrade of its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, which is currently banned by the Ukrainian constitution.

Yanukovych’s Two Years in Power.

photo: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów / flickr.com

Two years ago, on February 25, Viktor Yanukovych was inaugurated as the fourth president of Ukraine, as the nation of 46 million was struggling with both authoritarian and, many believe, colonial legacies. Earlier that month, he had narrowly won the second round of the elections, 49 to 46 percent, against the incumbent prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko.

In real figures, however, he got almost half a million votes less than in 2004, when he, as the incumbent prime minister himself, ran against the Orange candidate Viktor Yushchenko. A smaller number of votes secured him victory because his Orange rivals did their best to defeat themselves. Within five years, they had lost almost 3 million supporters who felt disappointed with their feeble policies, permanent infighting, and complete failure to deliver on extremely high expectations of the Orange Revolution. Many of their former supporters refused to choose between the bad and worse options. One-third of Ukrainian voters stayed home. Of those who showed up at the polling stations, 5 percent cast their ballots against both candidates. (This option has now been eliminated since such a protest vote is harmful, primarily for the incumbents.)

Yanukovych stated his intention to carry out much needed economic reforms largely neglected by his predecessors. He also promised to fix dysfunctional state institutions that, never strong, had become even weaker because of the squabbles between the Orange party prime minister and president. This turf war, which resulted in a near-collapse of the constitutional order, had been inevitable since the 2004 constitutional amendments, adopted hastily during the revolution as a part of the compromise with the previous regime, institutionalized the split between the presidency and prime ministry. The country became unmanageable because neither the old authoritarian methods nor the new democratic instruments, which required a firm rule of law, i.e., vigorous legal and institutional reforms, were useable. Yanukovych could go ahead with reforms or move back to the authoritarian rule of Leonid Kuchma, aptly described by analysts as a “blackmail state.” Such a state is based on three pillars: pervasive corruption, tight surveillance, and selective application of law. The government keeps everybody on the hook, taking ransom partly in money but primarily in loyalty.

With Chávez’s Illness, Is the Left All Right in Venezuela?

photo: Fotos Gov/Ba / flickr.com

When Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez spent a long absence from his country in Cuba earlier last year, opponents and sympathizers alike wondered about his future as his nation’s undisputed commander in chief. But mounting speculations about the exact nature and implications of his ailment proliferated. Later, it began to circulate that Chávez was suffering from an advanced case of colon cancer after information was made public by the Spanish media. After his health circumstances became known, Chávez pledged to the nation that he would continue ruling Venezuela “until 2031.” In fact, he boasted that he would consider the years between 2020 and 2030 to be his “golden decade.”

The question now is whether Chávez was just being waggish or whether he realizes that his ultimate fate is not necessarily in his hands. Many experts are asking whether Chávez’s health will permit him to keep the Bolivarian Revolution nimble, with some arguing that Chávez won’t be able to accomplish all of his visions. This is because he may have “only…two years to live,” and he may be physically unable to run for the presidency, possibly even for the 2012 electoral cycle.

Indeed, Chávez’s current health condition has fostered many questions about the expectations of his left-leaning constituency in Venezuela, a cohort that already has presented some socioeconomic problems to his leadership within the country’s widely accepted ideological bounds, some of these had helped spawn no shortage of previous diplomatic blunders and triumphs abroad. The country’s traditional concerns for the poor have centered on whether the delivery of promised benefits would continue rather than be aborted by a precipitous oil earnings. Nevertheless, a rabidly anti-Chávez Wall Street Journal, insisted that his cure for Venezuela’s past and current maladies has always been for Chávez to “deepen the socialist revolution: socialism, socialism and more socialism. We have to deepen the struggle and defeat the vices of the past that still persist among us: violence, insecurity, corruption, selfishness, individualism.”

The Economic Policy of the New Spanish Government.

photo: Lauren Tucker Photography / flickr.com

Economic recovery remains at the top of the agenda of the government of Mariano Rajoy. It has already agreed a set of new austerity measures aimed at reducing the public deficit and wining back the confidence of investors and European partners in the Spanish economy. It also plans to introduce further reforms of the banking sector and labour market. The speed and extent of these steps are complemented by a clear commitment to close cooperation with the EU. However, the worsening economic situation in the eurozone may hinder domestic anticrisis efforts, and the lack of significant improvement will aggravate social tensions.

The Economic Outlook. Spain is one of the European countries most affected by the recent global financial crisis. Its economic downturn was caused mainly by the collapse of the real-estate market and the excessive indebtedness of the private sector as well as by structural deficiencies. The worsening situation brought recession in 2009 and 2010 and an increase in the budget deficit and public debt. The most worrying result of the crisis, however, has been the unemployment rate, which has soared to the highest levels in the EU. In 2011, it reached almost 23% (5.3 million people) compared to 8.3% in 2007, but much more alarming is that currently nearly half of the youth workers remain unemployed. These numbers will hardly improve in the next two years. Additionally, after a slight 0.7% growth in GDP during 2011 (generated mainly thanks to rising exports), Spain will face another recession in 2012 and possibly in 2013. The main obstacles to a sustained economic recovery are labour market weakness, limited domestic demand, the lack of general fiscal stability, and investors’ low confidence in positive prospects for the Spanish economy.

The New Government’s Economic Agenda. The centre-right People’s Party (PP) led by Mariano Rajoy, which took over power in Spain on 21 December last year, has continued the path of austerity policies, whose unpopularity led to the electoral defeat of the ruling Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) led by José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Initially, Zapatero’s centre-left government responded to the crisis with increased public investment and fiscal spending aimed at stimulating demand. From the beginning of 2010, and not without the pressure of its European partners, Spain began a series of adjustments, including spending cuts and reforms of the pension system, labour market and the financial sector. Nonetheless, these measures were insufficient to reverse the rising trend of unemployment and to bring about sustained recovery.

Putin’s return to the presidency and its implications for Asia.

photo: World Economic Forum / flickr.com

A good six months before the actual presidential election, it was virtually certain that Vladimir Putin would return to the presidency. Such is the strange “democracy” of Russia. The announcement was followed by Putin’s call to create a Eurasian Union. The plan, unveiled in a newspaper article on October 4, is to achieve EU-style economic integration based on Russia’s customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus that would eventually encompass the whole Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

One needs to note, however, that Russia is currently experiencing conflict, mistrust, or friction in its relations with Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Moldova. Georgia withdrew from the CIS after fighting a war against Russia. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been taking independent stances from Russia. Putin’s recent remarks, which suggested his intention to annex South Ossetia and establish a Soviet-style alliance with Belarus, provoked a local backlash. Given the current state of affairs, Putin’s plan for the Eurasian Union should be taken more as a reflection of his political ambition to reestablish Russia’s leadership in the former Soviet Union region than as a realistic economic objective. It is also an expression of his wish to revive the Russian-led CIS as a potential rival to the EU and China. That is why Russia’s move is being criticized as imperialistic within and outside the country.

Under the tandem government of Putin as prime minister and Dmitry Medvedev as president, Russia’s military spending has been boosted despite growing budget deficits. Eyed as the most promising Russian leader after Putin and Medvedev, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin was asked to resign by Medvedev in September after criticizing the expanding military spending, a fact later acknowledged by Putin. Such was Russia’s resolve to continue to build up its military strength.

How will all this affect Putin’s policy towards Asia, particularly Japan and the rest of the Far East? The most pressing issues facing Russia’s Asia policy are the following: 1) restoring Russia’s political, economic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region lost after the collapse the Soviet Union; 2) building cooperative relations with an economically and militarily rising China while hedging against future threats; and 3) making effective use of a “US card” to play against China’s military build-up and aggressive maritime moves, while countering the deployment of US missile defense systems. Stemming from these strategic calculations is a cautious view within Russia about America’s declining presence in the Asia-Pacific region.